Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
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Publication:981035
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.01.005zbMath1245.91036OpenAlexW2093333858MaRDI QIDQ981035
Publication date: 8 July 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/29704/
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (27)
Auctions vs. fixed pricing: competing for budget constrained buyers ⋮ Bidding for incentive contracts ⋮ IT'S ABOUT TIME: IMPLICATIONS OF THE PERIOD LENGTH IN AN EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH MODEL ⋮ Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation ⋮ Minimum prices in a model with search frictions and price posting ⋮ DIRECTED SEARCH AND THE BERTRAND PARADOX ⋮ FREE PARKING FOR ALL IN SHOPPING MALLS ⋮ A theory of production, matching, and distribution ⋮ Directed Search with Endogenous Capacity ⋮ MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS ⋮ Sequentially mixed search and equilibrium price dispersion ⋮ High profit equilibria in directed search models ⋮ Wage-vacancy contracts and coordination frictions ⋮ Strategic limitation of market accessibility: search platform design and welfare ⋮ Trading mechanism selection with directed search when buyers are risk averse ⋮ Equivalence of canonical matching models ⋮ Seller competition by mechanism design ⋮ Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power ⋮ Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples ⋮ Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets ⋮ Commitment, advertising and efficiency of two-sided investment in competitive search equilibrium ⋮ Introduction to search theory and applications ⋮ On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition ⋮ A theory of sticky rents: search and bargaining with incomplete information ⋮ Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice ⋮ Too much waste, not enough rationing: the failure of stochastic, competitive markets ⋮ Pricing, signalling, and sorting with frictions
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