Equilibria for networks with malicious users
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Publication:985313
DOI10.1007/S10107-006-0015-2zbMath1203.90032OpenAlexW2075488114MaRDI QIDQ985313
Anastasios Viglas, George Karakostas
Publication date: 21 July 2010
Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-006-0015-2
Related Items (4)
Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Computational aspects of uncertainty profiles and angel-daemon games ⋮ Internalization of social cost in congestion games
Cites Work
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- How bad is selfish routing?
- On the relationship between Nash—Cournot and Wardrop equilibria
- Equilibria on a Congested Transportation Network
- Stackelberg scheduling strategies
- The price of selfish routing
- Algorithms and Computation
- Convex Analysis
- Traffic assignment problem for a general network
- The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
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