Environmental policy in majoritarian systems
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Publication:985904
DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2009.10.001zbMath1192.91165OpenAlexW1993848273MaRDI QIDQ985904
Per G. Fredriksson, Xenia Matschke, Jenny A. Minier
Publication date: 9 August 2010
Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://media.economics.uconn.edu/working/2008-01.pdf
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) History, political science (91F10) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
Cites Work
- Strategic delegation of environmental policy making
- The political economy of pollution taxes in a small open economy
- A note on environmental federalism: Interpreting some contradictory results
- Direct regulation of a mobile polluting firm.
- Pollution incidence and political jurisdiction: Evidence from the TRI.
- Cross-hauling of polluting factors.
- `Optimal' pollution abatement--whose benefits matter, and how much?
- Harmonization and optimal environmental policy in a federal system with asymmetric information
- Transboundary spillovers and decentralization of environmental policies
- On interjurisdictional competition and environmental federalism
- Ricardian rents, environmental policy and the `double-dividend' hypothesis
- Electoral Systems and Public Spending
- Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization
- Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard
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