Non-cooperative cost sharing games via subsidies

DOI10.1007/s00224-009-9197-3zbMath1203.91012OpenAlexW2011395778MaRDI QIDQ987398

Joseph (Seffi) Naor, Niv Buchbinder, Ariel Orda, Liane Lewin-Eytan

Publication date: 13 August 2010

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-009-9197-3

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmsgame theorynoncooperative gamestaxesprice of anarchycost-sharingset-coversubsides

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items

Efficiency and complexity of price competition among single-product vendors ⋮ Dynamic pricing of servers on trees ⋮ LP-based covering games with low price of anarchy ⋮ Enforcing efficient equilibria in network design games via subsidies

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