Facets of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium conjecture

DOI10.1007/s00224-009-9199-1zbMath1203.91043OpenAlexW2134414177WikidataQ122957590 ScholiaQ122957590MaRDI QIDQ987401

Andreas Pieris, Rainer Feldmann, Marios Mavronicolas

Publication date: 13 August 2010

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-009-9199-1

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumsocial cost

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Communication networks in operations research (90B18) Games involving graphs (91A43) Combinatorial games (91A46)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• On the structure and complexity of worst-case equilibria
• Cost sharing mechanisms for fair pricing of resource usage
• A new model for selfish routing
• Nash equilibria in discrete routing games with convex latency functions
• The price of selfish routing
• Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
• Selfish routing with incomplete information
• Structure and complexity of extreme Nash equilibria
• Non-cooperative games
• A contribution to von Neumann's theory of games
• Structural Information and Communication Complexity
• Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2003
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

This page was built for publication: Facets of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium conjecture