Ranking judgments in Arrow's setting

DOI10.1007/s11229-009-9568-yzbMath1205.03012DBLPjournals/synthese/Porello10OpenAlexW1968596541WikidataQ62047315 ScholiaQ62047315MaRDI QIDQ987464

Daniele Porello

Publication date: 13 August 2010

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9568-y

zbMATH Keywords

first-order logicArrow's theoremdiscursive dilemmaaggregation of ranking judgmentsConodorcet's paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Related Items (3)

Natural deduction for modal logic of judgment aggregation ⋮ Lifting integrity constraints in binary aggregation ⋮ Judgment aggregation in nonmonotonic logic

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Aggregating sets of judgments: two impossibility results compared. With a comment by Isaac Levi
• A simple proof of Sen's possibility theorem on majority decisions
• Logical constraints on judgement aggregation
• Belief merging and the discursive dilemma: an argument-based account to paradoxes of judgment aggregation
• Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation
• Axiomatizing collective judgment sets in a minimal logical language
• A generalised model of judgment aggregation

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