Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees

DOI10.1007/S11238-008-9118-YzbMath1232.91184OpenAlexW2062414577MaRDI QIDQ989921

Elisabeth Schulte

Publication date: 23 August 2010

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9118-y

zbMATH Keywords

information aggregationpreference heterogeneitycommittee decisions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (5)

On the drawbacks of large committees ⋮ Lying for votes ⋮ Communication compatible voting rules ⋮ Information disclosure with many alternatives ⋮ Information transmission and voting

Cites Work

• Aggregation of expert opinions
• Credible debate equilibria
• A Simple Model of Voice
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• Deliberation and Voting Rules

This page was built for publication: Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees