Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests?
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Publication:989972
DOI10.1007/S00355-009-0434-0zbMath1194.91065OpenAlexW3023829253MaRDI QIDQ989972
Roman M. Sheremeta, Jing-Jing Zhang
Publication date: 23 August 2010
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/40976/1/2010_ZhangJ_Zhang-SCW.pdf
Related Items (11)
Defense against an opportunistic challenger: theory and experiments ⋮ Learning in rent-seeking contests with payoff risk and foregone payoff information ⋮ Endogenous interdependent preferences in a dynamical contest model ⋮ An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games ⋮ Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: cost structure and prize allocation rules ⋮ That's the ticket: explicit lottery randomisation and learning in Tullock contests ⋮ Learning and dropout in contests: an experimental approach ⋮ Identifying types in contest experiments ⋮ Level-\(k\) models and overspending in contests ⋮ Are individuals more risk and ambiguity averse in a group environment or alone? Results from an experimental study ⋮ Strategically equivalent contests
Uses Software
Cites Work
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- On the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment: new experimental evidence regarding Linda
- Barking up the right tree: Are small groups rational agents?
- Individual and group decision making under risk: An experimental study of Bayesian updating and violations of first-order stochastic dominance
- Individual or team decision-making--causes and consequences of self-selection
- Asymmetric contests with general technologies
- Two-stage contests with budget constraints: an experimental study
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