Voces populi and the art of listening
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Publication:989981
DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0442-0zbMath1194.91075OpenAlexW2070475846MaRDI QIDQ989981
Publication date: 23 August 2010
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163935
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Vote trading in public elections
- The Borda and Condorcet principles: Three medieval applications
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Unsettling aspects of voting theory
- The Borda count and agenda manipulation
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
- Single Transferable Votes with Tax Cuts
- Parties as Political Intermediaries
- Circle Pictograms for Vote Vectors
- On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
- Condorcet’s Paradox
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