Perfect Bayesian implementation when the planner is a player

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.02.003zbMath1232.91196OpenAlexW2020176575MaRDI QIDQ990279

Yunfeng Luo, Changchen Liu

Publication date: 6 September 2010

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.02.003

zbMATH Keywords

social choice functionBayesian reliable objectionFGP equilibriumperfect Bayesian implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Two-agent interactive implementation

Cites Work

• Interactive implementation
• The theory of implementation when the planner is a player