The emergence of rational behavior in the presence of stochastic perturbations
DOI10.1214/09-AAP651zbMath1195.91011arXiv0906.2094OpenAlexW2000033387WikidataQ60142090 ScholiaQ60142090MaRDI QIDQ990385
Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Aris L. Moustakas
Publication date: 1 September 2010
Published in: The Annals of Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0906.2094
stochastic differential equationLyapunov functionNash equilibriumdominancecongestion gamesasymptotic stochastic stabilityexponential learningreplicator dinamics
Stochastic ordinary differential equations (aspects of stochastic analysis) (60H10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Applications of Brownian motions and diffusion theory (population genetics, absorption problems, etc.) (60J70) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Related Items (16)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Time averages, recurrence and transience in the stochastic replicator dynamics
- The emergence of rational behavior in the presence of stochastic perturbations
- Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
- Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- The long-run behavior of the stochastic replicator dynamics
- Potential games
- Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
- Non-cooperative games
- ON THE REPLICATOR DYNAMICS BEHAVIOR UNDER STRATONOVICH TYPE RANDOM PERTURBATIONS
This page was built for publication: The emergence of rational behavior in the presence of stochastic perturbations