Strategy-proofness and weighted voting

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.02.001zbMath1232.91171OpenAlexW2078808678MaRDI QIDQ991312

Jerry S. Kelly, Donald E. Campbell

Publication date: 7 September 2010

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.02.001

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofweighted votingnon-reversal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving ⋮ Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization ⋮ Yet another characterization of the majority rule ⋮ There are more strategy-proof procedures than you think

Cites Work

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• Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem
• On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
• Tournament solutions and majority voting
• A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
• Social aggregators
• Maskin monotonic aggregation rules
• Nash implementation of the majority rule
• Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

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