Efficient and strategy-proof voting over connected coalitions: a possibility result

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.009zbMath1232.91169OpenAlexW2075299163MaRDI QIDQ991326

Veronica Block

Publication date: 7 September 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.009

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencystrategy-proofnessconnected coalitionsgeneralized single-peakedness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
• Voting by Committees
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

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