Signal jamming in a sequential auction
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Publication:991346
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.04.008zbMath1232.91289OpenAlexW2147386955WikidataQ57443271 ScholiaQ57443271MaRDI QIDQ991346
Elmar G. Wolfstetter, Wei Ding, Thomas D. Jeitschko
Publication date: 7 September 2010
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13291/1/261_01.pdf
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Related Items (3)
Uninformed bidding in sequential auctions ⋮ Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction ⋮ Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions
Cites Work
- The ratchet effect and bargaining power in a two-stage model of competitive bidding
- Bottom-fishing and declining prices in sequential auctions
- He who must not be named
- Partial pooling at the reserve price in auctions with resale opportunities
- First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge
- The declining price anomaly
- Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions
- Equilibrium price paths in sequential auctions with stochastic supply
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