To lead or not to lead. Endogenous sequencing in public goods games

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.04.025zbMath1231.91055OpenAlexW1484242533MaRDI QIDQ991355

Stefan D. Haigner, Florian Wakolbinger

Publication date: 7 September 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.04.025

zbMATH Keywords

experimentendogenoussequencingpublic goodsleadership

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (3)

Who are the voluntary leaders? Experimental evidence from a sequential contribution game ⋮ Leading by example in a public goods experiment with benefit heterogeneity ⋮ Leading by example versus leading by words in voluntary contribution experiments

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment

This page was built for publication: To lead or not to lead. Endogenous sequencing in public goods games