To reveal or not to reveal? Strategic disclosure of private information in negotiation

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2010.04.013zbMath1205.91073OpenAlexW1982226485MaRDI QIDQ992617

Michael J. Ferguson, Ching Chyi Lee

Publication date: 9 September 2010

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.04.013

zbMATH Keywords

game theorygroup decisions and negotiationsbounded rationalityexperimental economicshistory-consistent rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (3)

A simultaneous multi-issue negotiation through autonomous agents ⋮ An approximate solution to rent-seeking contests with private information ⋮ Quality disclosure strategies for small business enterprises in a competitive marketplace

Cites Work

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• Bargaining and search with incomplete information about outside options
• The Role of External Search in Bilateral Bargaining
• On the Concept of the Value of Information in Competitive Situations
• Bargaining and Search with Recall: A Two-Period Model with Complete Information

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