The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure
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Publication:992682
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2010.05.014zbMath1205.91022OpenAlexW2154564295MaRDI QIDQ992682
María Gómez-Rúa, Juan J. Vidal-Puga
Publication date: 9 September 2010
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.05.014
Related Items (25)
New results on egalitarian values for games with a priori unions ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification ⋮ A coalitional compromised solution for cooperative games ⋮ Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution ⋮ The proportional Shapley value and applications ⋮ The balanced contributions property for equal contributors ⋮ Sharing the surplus and proportional values ⋮ The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures ⋮ New characterizations of the Owen and Banzhaf-Owen values using the intracoalitional balanced contributions property ⋮ On new characterizations of the Owen value ⋮ Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value ⋮ Nullified equal loss property and equal division values ⋮ Effects of Players’ Nullification and Equal (Surplus) Division Values ⋮ Axiomatic of the Shapley value of a game with a priori unions ⋮ Bargaining and membership ⋮ Nash-stable coalition partition and potential functions in games with coalition structure ⋮ A new look at the role of players' weights in the weighted Shapley value ⋮ The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions ⋮ Values and coalition configurations ⋮ New axiomatizations of the Owen value ⋮ Weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values ⋮ The Owen and Banzhaf–Owen values revisited ⋮ The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure ⋮ THE SHAPLEY-SOLIDARITY VALUE FOR GAMES WITH A COALITION STRUCTURE ⋮ An axiomatic approach in minimum cost spanning tree problems with groups
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