Incentives and individual motivation in supervised work groups

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2010.05.023zbMath1205.90170OpenAlexW1973550142MaRDI QIDQ992692

Ugo Merlone, Arianna Dal Forno

Publication date: 9 September 2010

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.05.023

zbMATH Keywords

productionincentivesorganization theoryorganizational behaviorindividual motivation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)

Related Items (5)

The newsvendor's optimal incentive contracts for multiple advertisers ⋮ Relative performance evaluation for dynamic contracts in a large competitive market ⋮ Fund managers' competition for investment flows based on relative performance ⋮ Stackelberg equilibria in managerial delegation games ⋮ Envy effects on conflict dynamics in supervised work groups

Cites Work

• On optimal sharing rules in discrete- and continuous-time principal-agent problems with exponential utility
• Human resource planning in knowledge-intensive operations: a model for learning with stochastic turnover.

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