Perceptron versus automaton in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1007/s11238-009-9158-yzbMath1233.91031OpenAlexW1994196564MaRDI QIDQ993503

Sylvain Béal

Publication date: 20 September 2010

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9158-y

zbMATH Keywords

perceptronbounded complexityprisoner's dilemmaautomatoninformation processingfinitely repeated gamesmachine games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

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