On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules

DOI10.1007/s11238-009-9187-6zbMath1233.91090OpenAlexW2166865384MaRDI QIDQ993505

Mostapha Diss, Vincent R. Merlin

Publication date: 20 September 2010

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9187-6

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityinstabilityscoring rulesself-selectivityimpartial culture assumption

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner ⋮ An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: the stability of scoring rules ⋮ Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules

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