Club networks with multiple memberships and noncooperative stability
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Publication:993780
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.006zbMath1200.91053OpenAlexW2134685157MaRDI QIDQ993780
Frank H. jun. Page, Myrna Holtz Wooders
Publication date: 20 September 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://caepr.indiana.edu/RePEc/inu/caeprp/CAEPR2009-005.pdf
Related Items (6)
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