The myth of the folk theorem

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.016zbMath1207.91012OpenAlexW2051280392WikidataQ101126436 ScholiaQ101126436MaRDI QIDQ993783

Adam Tauman Kalai, Christian Borgs, Nicole Immorlica, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Jennifer T. Chayes

Publication date: 20 September 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.016

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamescomputable general equilibrium models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) 2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites Work

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• Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations
• On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of existence
• Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
• The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information