On the rule of \(k\) names

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.008zbMath1200.91084OpenAlexW2166044814MaRDI QIDQ993784

Danilo Coelho, Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 20 September 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.008

zbMATH Keywords

voting rulesstrong Nash equilibriumconstitutional designrule of three namesscreening candidates

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (13)

Order-\(k\) rationality ⋮ On the advantages and disadvantages of being the first mover under rules of k names ⋮ Manipulability of consular election rules ⋮ Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda ⋮ How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names ⋮ Balancing the power to appoint officers ⋮ Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences ⋮ On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals ⋮ A solution to the two-person implementation problem ⋮ Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences ⋮ Bargaining through approval ⋮ Choosers as extension axioms ⋮ Social Choice Theory

Cites Work

• How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
• The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
• Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
• Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
• Voting by Committees
• Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence
• Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
• Final-Offer Arbitration
• An Analysis of Simple Voting Systems for Electing Committees

This page was built for publication: On the rule of \(k\) names