Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games
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Publication:993792
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.004zbMath1201.91160OpenAlexW3121670828MaRDI QIDQ993792
Alison Watts, Matthew O. Jackson
Publication date: 20 September 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/95031/
Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Matching models (91B68)
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