The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2008.12.002zbMath1194.91150OpenAlexW3123123190WikidataQ124806031 ScholiaQ124806031MaRDI QIDQ994081

Mauricio G. Villena, John K. Stranlund, Carlos A. Chávez

Publication date: 17 September 2010

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1176&context=resec_faculty_pubs

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintyasymmetric informationmonitoringcomplianceemissions taxesenforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

Cites Work

• Noncompliant firms in transferable discharge permit markets: Some extensions
• Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes
• Marketable permits, market power, and cheating
• The use of ambient inspections in environmental monitoring and enforcement when the inspection agency cannot commit itself to announced inspection probabilities
• Endogenous monitoring and enforcement of a transferable emissions permit system
• Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes

This page was built for publication: The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly