On reducing the windfall profits in environmental subsidy programs

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2009.04.002zbMath1194.91139OpenAlexW2170990027MaRDI QIDQ994083

Daan P. van Soest, Carmen Arguedas

Publication date: 17 September 2010

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2009.04.002

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationenvironmental policyabatement technology adoptioninvestment subsidies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites Work

• Incentives for advanced pollution abatement technology at the industry level: An evaluation of policy alternatives
• Dynamic incentives of environmental regulations: The effects of alternative policy instruments on technology diffusion
• Optimal environmental regulation of politically influential sectors with asymmetric information
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control

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