When additional resource stocks reduce welfare
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Publication:994091
DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2009.08.001zbMath1194.91140OpenAlexW2110464358MaRDI QIDQ994091
Hassan Benchekroun, Alex Halsema, Cees A. A. M. Withagen
Publication date: 17 September 2010
Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2009.08.001
Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Welfare economics (91B15)
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Cites Work
- Strong time-consistency in the cartel-versus-fringe model
- On nonrenewable resource oligopolies: the asymmetric case
- Potential competition and the monopoly price of an exhaustible resource
- Entry deterrence and overexploitation of the fishery
- On Two Folk Theorems Concerning the Extraction of Exhaustible Resources
- Entry Deterrence in the Commons
- Heterogeneous Demand and Order of Resource Extraction
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