When additional resource stocks reduce welfare

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2009.08.001zbMath1194.91140OpenAlexW2110464358MaRDI QIDQ994091

Hassan Benchekroun, Alex Halsema, Cees A. A. M. Withagen

Publication date: 17 September 2010

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2009.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumnonrenewable resourcesdominant firm versus fringe

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (8)

An oligopoly-fringe model with HARA preferences ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Monopoly, unilateral climate policies and limit pricing ⋮ Dynamic games in the economics of natural resources: a survey ⋮ An oligopoly-fringe non-renewable resource game in the presence of a renewable substitute ⋮ Should the global community welcome new oil discoveries? ⋮ Dynamic games between firms and infinitely lived consumers: a review of the literature ⋮ Battle for climate and scarcity rents: beyond the linear-quadratic case

Cites Work

• Strong time-consistency in the cartel-versus-fringe model
• On nonrenewable resource oligopolies: the asymmetric case
• Potential competition and the monopoly price of an exhaustible resource
• Entry deterrence and overexploitation of the fishery
• On Two Folk Theorems Concerning the Extraction of Exhaustible Resources
• Entry Deterrence in the Commons
• Heterogeneous Demand and Order of Resource Extraction

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