The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas
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Publication:995675
DOI10.1007/s11238-007-9028-4zbMath1161.91350OpenAlexW1965366519WikidataQ56081059 ScholiaQ56081059MaRDI QIDQ995675
Publication date: 10 September 2007
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9028-4
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