On the size and structure of group cooperation
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Publication:996366
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.011zbMath1186.91026OpenAlexW3125599737MaRDI QIDQ996366
Matthew Haag, Roger D. Lagunoff
Publication date: 14 September 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269463/files/twerp650.pdf?subformat=pdfa
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