The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information
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Publication:996371
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.010zbMath1186.91048OpenAlexW3125859975MaRDI QIDQ996371
Publication date: 14 September 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80206
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (8)
Information transmission in coalitional voting games ⋮ Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning ⋮ A note on the private core and coalitional fairness under asymmetric information ⋮ Signaling, screening, and core stability ⋮ Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core ⋮ Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information ⋮ On fairness of equilibria in economies with differential information ⋮ COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS
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- Market Participation and Sunspot Equilibria
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