On the learnability of majority rule

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.012zbMath1186.91095OpenAlexW2168953334MaRDI QIDQ996375

Yuval Salant

Publication date: 14 September 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.012

zbMATH Keywords

learningmajority ruletournamentscommitteessocial choicechoice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Simple games with many effective voters

Cites Work

• Learnability and rationality of choice.
• A combinatorial problem; stability and order for models and theories in infinitary languages
• On the density of families of sets
• Why Are Certain Properties of Binary Relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
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