The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.001zbMath1186.91081OpenAlexW1986260042MaRDI QIDQ996377

Mark Fey, Jae-Hoon Kim

Publication date: 14 September 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.001

zbMATH Keywords

electionsvotingprivate informationpivotal voteradversarial preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (8)

Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy ⋮ Information structures and information aggregation in threshold equilibria in elections ⋮ Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers ⋮ The fragility of information aggregation in large elections ⋮ Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting ⋮ Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility ⋮ Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences ⋮ Voting on tricky questions

Cites Work

• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates

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