Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities
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Publication:996381
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.001zbMath1186.91111OpenAlexW2168150498MaRDI QIDQ996381
Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein
Publication date: 14 September 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.001
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
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- Efficient bidding with externalities
- A set of axioms for a value for partition function games
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- Values of games in partition function form
- A theory of endogenous coalition structures
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
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