Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
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Publication:996393
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.002zbMath1186.91082OpenAlexW3021626179MaRDI QIDQ996393
Ton Storcken, Stefan Maus, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 14 September 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/737518/guid-479c5d15-abc6-46f0-9f5b-e2cdfd39484f-ASSET1.0.pdf
Related Items (14)
On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules ⋮ Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity ⋮ Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship ⋮ On the safety of group manipulation ⋮ An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities ⋮ Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules ⋮ Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities ⋮ Manipulability in school choice ⋮ Voting Procedures, Complexity of ⋮ Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable ⋮ Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability ⋮ Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions ⋮ Dictatorship versus manipulability
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