Representing roommates' preferences with symmetric utilities

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.02.013zbMath1186.91153OpenAlexW2001086140WikidataQ126264200 ScholiaQ126264200MaRDI QIDQ996394

José Alvaro Rodrigues-Neto

Publication date: 14 September 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.02.013

zbMATH Keywords

stable matchingroommates

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (3)

Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems ⋮ When do stable roommate matchings exist? A review ⋮ The roommate problem with externalities

Cites Work

• On the existence of stable roommate matchings
• A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
• An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Unnamed Item

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