Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.006zbMath1186.91130OpenAlexW2083658710MaRDI QIDQ996400

Nicolás Porteiro, Gwenaël Piaser, Andrea Attar

Publication date: 14 September 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/3054/1/negotiation.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

common agencymenus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

Related Items (3)

A note on common agency models of moral hazard ⋮ Erratum to ``Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency: [Journal of economic theory 111 (2003) 88--109] ⋮ Participation in moral hazard problems

Cites Work

• Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
• Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents

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