Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
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Publication:997202
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.02.002zbMath1283.91058OpenAlexW2084564739MaRDI QIDQ997202
Ton Storcken, Stefan Maus, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 23 July 2007
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.02.002
Related Items (4)
On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules ⋮ Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship ⋮ Gains from manipulating social choice rules ⋮ Dictatorship versus manipulability
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- Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
- Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
- Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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