Arrovian aggregation for preferences over sets

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.01.006zbMath1283.91046OpenAlexW2041496510MaRDI QIDQ997203

Levent Kutlu

Publication date: 23 July 2007

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.01.006

zbMATH Keywords

Gibbard-Satterthwaite theoremArrow's impossibilitysocial choice hyperfunctionsuperdictatorial domain

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
• Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation
• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
• A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
• Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes