A note on selection of proposers in coalitional bargaining

DOI10.1007/s00182-008-0131-8zbMath1155.91315OpenAlexW2079341648MaRDI QIDQ999118

Tomohiko Kawamori

Publication date: 30 January 2009

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0131-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

A non-cooperative foundation for the continuous Raiffa solution ⋮ Delay, multiplicity, and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games ⋮ Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences ⋮ Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining ⋮ On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols

Cites Work

• Noncooperative selection of the core
• A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining

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