Information in tournaments under limited liability

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.06.002zbMath1153.91630OpenAlexW2130036810MaRDI QIDQ999734

Jörg Budde

Publication date: 10 February 2009

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22927

zbMATH Keywords

informationtournamentcontestlikelihood ratio distribution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (1)

An envelope approach to tournament design

Cites Work

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• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• A class of extremum problems related to agency models with imperfect monitoring
• Contest architecture
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• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents
• Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
• Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition

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