Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
zbMATH Open document ID: 1167.91354
author: Dinesh Garg
author: Sujit Gujar
author: Y. Narahari
published in: Sādhanā
publication date: 2009-02-12T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 5507230
zbMATH Keywords: Mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: game theory
zbMATH Keywords: social choice functions
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s12046-008-0009-2
OpenAlex ID: W2147746955
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DOI: 10.1007/S12046-008-0009-2
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5507230