Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
zbMATH Open document ID: 1154.91378
author: Alex Gershkov
author: Balázs Szentes
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-02-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
zbMATH DE Number: 5509478
zbMATH Keywords: information aggregation
zbMATH Keywords: voting
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2008.02.004
OpenAlex ID: W2103553799
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2008.02.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5509478