Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
zbMATH Open document ID: 1216.91013
author: Hervé Moulin
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-02-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 5509480
zbMATH Keywords: VCG mechanisms
zbMATH Keywords: worst case analysis
zbMATH Keywords: budget surplus or deficit
zbMATH Keywords: asymptotic budget-balance
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2008.03.003
OpenAlex ID: W1993970692
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2008.03.003
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5509480