Folk theorem with communication
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Folk theorem with communication
zbMATH Open document ID: 1154.91336
author: Ichiro Obara
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-02-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 5509481
zbMATH Keywords: communication
zbMATH Keywords: folk theorem
zbMATH Keywords: private monitoring
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2007.08.005
OpenAlex ID: W2167389458
cites work: Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
cites work: Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
cites work: Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
cites work: Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
cites work: A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
cites work: Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
cites work: The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
cites work: The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
cites work: Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
cites work: Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
cites work: Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
cites work: Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2007.08.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5509481