Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1154.91522
author: Philip Bond
author: Armando Gomes
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-02-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B38
zbMATH DE Number: 5509484
zbMATH Keywords: multitasking
zbMATH Keywords: first-order approach
zbMATH Keywords: log-concavity
zbMATH Keywords: Pólya frequency sequence
zbMATH Keywords: fragility
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2008.05.008
OpenAlex ID: W2106040607
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2008.05.008
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5509484