An axiomatic theory of political representation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: An axiomatic theory of political representation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1154.91376
author: Christopher P. Chambers
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-02-19T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: CaltechAUTHORS:20170809-092845210
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 5509493
zbMATH Keywords: Gerrymandering
zbMATH Keywords: representative systems
zbMATH Keywords: proportional representation
zbMATH Keywords: social choice
zbMATH Keywords: quasi-arithmetic means
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2027851909
cites work: Q5514010
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2008.06.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5509493