Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
zbMATH Open document ID: 1155.91359
author: George Simon Board
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-02-26T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 5520057
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
zbMATH Keywords: information revelation
zbMATH Keywords: bundling
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-006-0177-4
OpenAlex ID: W2009251648
cites work: Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
cites work: Information structures in optimal auctions
cites work: Bundling decisions for selling multiple objects
cites work: Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
cites work: A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
cites work: Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information
cites work: Information Acquisition in Auctions
cites work: Mid-auction information acquisition
DOI: 10.1007/S00199-006-0177-4
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5520057