Auctions with costly information acquisition
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Auctions with costly information acquisition
zbMATH Open document ID: 1155.91363
author: George Jacques Crémer
author: Charles Z. Zheng
author: Yossi Spiegel
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-02-26T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: auctions screen.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5520060
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2126754427
cites work: Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-007-0301-0
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5520060