Auction design with opportunity cost
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Auction design with opportunity cost
zbMATH Open document ID: 1155.91368
author: George Jingfeng Lu
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-02-26T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5520061
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-008-0331-2
OpenAlex ID: W2037075382
cites work: Optimal auctions revisited
cites work: Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
cites work: Optimal Auction Design
cites work: Competitive bidding with entry costs
cites work: Participation costs and efficient auctions
cites work: Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
DOI: 10.1007/S00199-008-0331-2
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5520061