Probabilistic justification and the regress problem
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Probabilistic justification and the regress problem
zbMATH Open document ID: 1163.03006
author: J. Martínez
published in: Studia Logica
publication date: 2009-03-17T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: Probabilistic Justification and the Regress Problem PA.pdf
review text: Consider a countable infinite sequence \((p_n)_n\) of propositions. The Regress Problem is the following foundationalist challenge to infinitism: If one's belief in some proposition \(p_0\) is justified by one's belief in some other proposition \(p_1\), which in turn is justified by one's belief in yet another proposition \(p_2\), and so on \textit{ad infinitum}, then there is no epistemic justification for one's belief in any of the propositions \(p_n\). Consider next a probability measure \(P\) and a countable infinite sequence \((S_n)_n\) of events -- identified by the authors with propositions. In the terminology of the article under review, \(S_{n+1}\) \textit{probabilistically supports} \(S_n\) if and only if \(P(S_n|S_{n+1})>P(S_n|\neg S_{n+1})\). The Probabilistic Regress Problem is now the following contemporary counterpart of the traditional Regress Problem: If one's belief in some proposition \(S_0\) is probabilistically supported by \(S_1\), which in turn is probabilistically supported by \(S_2\), and so on \textit{ad infinitum}, then there is no probabilistic justification for one's belief in any of the propositions \(S_n\). The (Probabilistic) Regress Problem is typically used by foundationalists to challenge infinitism through a two-pronged attack: Firstly, they argue that \textit{finite minds} are incapable of drawing infinitely many conclusions in finite time [cf., e.g., \textit{R.~Fumerton}, Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell (2006)]. Secondly, foundationalists claim that inference from \(S_{n+1}\) to \(S_n\) cannot originate, but only \textit{transfer} justification [cf. \textit{J.~Dancy}, Introduction to contemporary epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell (1985)]. On a number of occasions, \textit{P. D.~Klein} [e.g. in: \textit{M.~Steup} and \textit{E.~Sosa} (eds.), Contemporary debates in epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell, 131--140 (2005)] has dismissed both of these objections to infinitism by arguing that they essentially amount to begging the question. T…
reviewed by: Frederik Herzberg
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 03A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 60A99
zbMATH DE Number: 5529385
zbMATH Keywords: probabilistic justification
zbMATH Keywords: regress problem
zbMATH Keywords: foundationalism
zbMATH Keywords: infinitism
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2102183916
DOI: 10.1007/S11225-008-9132-7
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5529385